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Abstract: I advance the Radically Enactive Cognition (REC) program by developing Hutto & 
Satne’s (2015) and Hutto & Myin’s (2017) idea that contentful cognition emerges through 
sociocultural activities, which require a contentless form of intentionality. Proponents of REC 
then face a functional challenge: what is the function of higher cognitive skills, given the empirical 
findings that engaging in higher-cognitive activities is not correlated with cognitive amelioration 
(Kornblith, 2012)? I answer that functional challenge by arguing that higher cognition is an 
adaptive tool of the social systems we are embedded in, therefore, it is not necessarily aimed at 
achieving better cognitive states. In order to do so, I suggest interpreting key insights from 
autopoietic enactivism through REC lenses. 
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Resumo: eu avanço o programa da Cognição Radicalmente Enativa (CRE) desenvolvendo a ideia 
de Hutto & Satne (2015) e Hutto & Myin (2017) de que a cognição com conteúdo  emerge de 
atividades socioculturais, que demandam uma forma de intencionalidade desprovida de conteúdo. 
Proponentes de CRE então enfrentam um desafio funcional: qual é a função de habilidades de 
cognição superior, dadas as descobertas empíricas segundo as quais o engajamento em atividades 
de cognição superior não é correlato com melhoras cognitivas (Kornblith, 2012)? Eu respondo ao 
desafio funcional argumentando que a cognição superior é uma ferramenta adaptativa dos sistemas 
sociais em que estamos imbuídos, portanto, ela não é necessariamente direcionada à melhora de 
estados cognitivos. Para fazer isso, eu interpreto insights centrais ao enativismo autopoiético pelas 
lentes de CRE. 





According to enactivism, the unit of analysis of cognition is not the 
brain (or its internal operations), but the organism as it is dynamically coupled 
with the environment. Cognition is enactive in the sense that it depends on the 
organism’s actions upon its surroundings and it cannot be fully understood 
detached from it, for the environmental layout constrains the set of possible 
actions the organism can undertake, and its actions in turn affect the 
environmental layout itself. In large timescales, therefore, the causal coupling 
between organism and environment shapes its inherited (phylogenetic) and 
acquired (ontogenetic) abilities which dynamically shape its cognitive niche. 
That means that an organism achieves and maintains its cognitive processes 
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through its actions, which are the exercise of situated abilities, i.e., abilities that 
are relative to its bodily morphology, history of development and immediate 
environment. Hence enactivism is in principle in tune with the idea of embodied 
cognition (VARELA, THOMPSON & ROSCH, 1991). 
There is, however, a choice to be made: should we opt for 
Conservatively Enactive Cognition, which posits special kinds of action-related 
representations in order to explain all levels of cognition, or should we go 
radical with Radically Enactive Cognition (henceforth REC), which 
emphasizes that representational content is not needed to explain a sufficiently 
large basic level of cognition? On the one hand, although REC has not come 
as far as to set the precise boundaries of basic cognition, i.e., the level of 
cognition that does not involve representational content, it has successfully 
explained a wide range of cognitive phenomena, from navigation (BEER, 
2003) and object tracking (THELEN et al. 2001), to coordination (Haken et 
al., 1985). None of these explanations required positing representational 
content (CHEMERO, 2009, chapters 3 and 4) – as long as representations are 
understood as semantically laden structures that have (at the bare minimum) 
accuracy conditions. On the other hand, there has been no conclusive attempt 
to naturalize representations and content more generally (which is known as 
the Hard Problem of Content, cf. Hutto & Myin, 2013). REC, therefore, 
seems to have the upper hand in the naturalistic framework. 
 However, if RECers reject the ubiquity of representations, it follows 
that there is no clear place for higher cognitive activities in the REC 
framework, given that these activities are traditionally taken to involve the 
manipulation of representational content1. For instance, reflecting on our 
mental states, inferring predictively and deliberating through counterfactuals 
are some cognitive tasks where the target-domain is absent, unlike the 
immediate environment – hence the need for representations and 
detachability. At this juncture, RECers face a variety of the scale-up problem that 
we can state in a general manner as follows: how could representations (and 
content more generally) come into play in higher cognition? More precisely, 
how could higher cognitive activities take place, given that they cannot be reduced to 
                                               
1 The use of ‘higher’ to denote a difference in complexity from ‘basic’ cognitive skills must come with a 
warning. If enactivism (radical or not) is correct, the traditional cognitivist view on the hierarchical 
structure of cognition – according to which perception is at the bottom, cognitive processing is in the 
middle and intentional action is the output – is simply mistaken, for cognition is achieved in loops of 
action and perception (HURLEY, 2001). I hereby use ‘higher’ and ‘basic’ in order to highlight, 
respectively, the absence and presence of representations in each strata of cognition. I do not hold, for to 
do so would be inimical to enactivism, that there is a separate and fully detachable level of cognition 
which is not at least indirectly situated. 
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naturalistically well-behaved structures and processes? In section 2, I advance the REC 
program by exploring an answer to that question. In Section 3, I show how 
that answer leads to another question, what I call the functional challenge, 
namely: if we are selected to employ our higher-cognitive abilities (whatever 
they are), how can we account for the widely known limitations of our higher-
cognitive skills? In section 4 I offer my solution to that challenge and in 
section 5 I review some empirical studies that lend indirect support for that 
solution. 
1. Emergence of content and social activity 
How do representations come into play in higher cognition? Hutto 
and Satne (2015) and Hutto and Myin (2017) address that initial challenge by 
arguing that we are able to track and respond to changes in our immediate 
environment given our phylogenetic and ontogenetic developments. The 
paradigmatic case is that of a frog and its catching-flies ability. A frog can 
successfully track and catch flies because its inherited and developed abilities 
enable it do so, even though it plausibly lacks representational states. Thus 
radical enactivists devise what they call teleosemiotics, a theory of contentless 
intentionality that explains our basal directedness through our embodied 
abilities and their history. Teleosemiotics preserves the most promising feature 
of teleosemantics developed by Millikan (1984, 1995), namely, that the 
normative character of intentionality can be naturalized through the 
development of a function in the biological sense. But unlike teleosemantics, 
teleosemiotics neither implies that intentionality is semantically structured nor 
that there is a central executive consumer of intentional content, for: 
No one should doubt that creatures can respond to features of current 
environments in ways that are out of step with the ways that their ancestors 
would have responded when the kind of responses in question were originally 
selected for. No doubt responses that are the products of evolution can be 
misaligned in this limited sense. But this does not establish that in doing so the 
imagined creatures are “getting things wrong”— that they are representing 
features of the world in a way that violates a norm of truth. Fundamentally, as 
Stich aptly highlights, “natural selection does not care about truth; it cares about 
reproductive success” (HUTTO & MYIN, 2013, p.111-112). 
That is: natural selection shapes us to interact proficiently with our 
environments, and failing to do so is not sufficient to misrepresent, although it 
is sufficient to explain normativity within REC: we simply fail to exercise our 
embodied abilities, thus failing to achieve the relevant cognitive states. The 
idea of a primitive sort of intentional directedness deprived of content is 
important because it helps to explain the emergence of contentful cognition. 
For, if the exercise of our ability to partake in social activities requires 
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cognition, and if cognition entails intentionality, whereas intentionality does 
not entail content, contentful cognition arises once an organism is socially 
embedded and engages in social actions2. As Hutto and Myin put it: 
Only minds that have mastered a certain, specialized kind of sociocultural 
practice can engage in content-involving cognition. Should creatures with basic 
minds manage to master such practices, they would gain new cognitive 
capacities and become open to new possibilities for engaging with the world and 
other creatures (2017, p.134). 
Although proponents of Ur-Intentionality do not develop the 
argument further, a plausible requirement for engaging in “specialized kind of 
sociocultural practice” is our ability to perform joint action tasks. Gallagher 
(2008) and Gallagher and Varga (2014) construe that ability in tune with REC 
by building upon the findings on joint activity by Gallese and his colleagues 
(GALLESE et al, 1996, GALLESE & GOLDMAN, 1998). According to these 
results, there is a class of neurons in the primates’ premotor cortex, the mirror-
neuron system, that discharge not only when the primate is performing goal-
related tasks, but also when it observes other individuals performing goal-
related tasks. Doing so plausibly allows for coordinated social action, where 
autonomous agents attune their mirror-neuron systems in order to anticipate 
motor responses of others in loop3. This opens way for a REC account of 
social interaction, according to which:  
There is […] an experiential dimension of interpersonal relationships, which 
enables a direct grasping of the sense of the actions performed by others, and of 
the emotions, and sensations they experience. This dimension of social 
cognition is embodied in that it mediates between the multimodal experiential 
knowledge we hold of our lived body and the experience we make of others 
(GALLESE, 2006, p.16, emphasis added). 
A REC construal of Gallese’s point allows to say that we directly, i.e., 
non-representationally, perceive the mental states of others, which paves the 
way for more complex sociocultural practices that involve contentful 
cognition, such as the use of verbalized language to convey information among 
                                               
2 This is the point where REC meets cognitive integration, the view that ‘cognizers are embodied and 
located in a situation which has both physical and social aspects, and that some bodily interactions with 
the environment constitute cognitive processing’ (MENARY, 2010: 227; see also: MENARY, 2013). 
3 Traditionally, this result has been interpreted as a simulation process (GOLDMAN, 2005), in which the 
agent creates “pretend states” in herself and use these states to match the states of others. Therefore, 
Goldman’s simulation theory makes use of the idea of building an internal model in order to explain mind-
reading cognitive activities, preserving a central role for representational content in sociocultural 
cognition. However, it is doubtful that the representational content in pretend states could explain the 
resonance of the mirror-neuron system, for the system exhibits motoric states of anticipatory and 
complementary actions, so they do not simply match the mental states of others, nor there is any 
discrimination between individuals made by the mirror-neuron system itself (GALLAGHER, 2008). 
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others individuals that share the same cognitive traits. Alternatively, it is 
because we are able to entertain non-representational sociocultural cognition 
that we engage in patterns of activity which are favorable for the emergence of 
higher cognition, given our specific ability to partake in linguistic practices. 
Note that if sociocultural practices require cognition, and if cognition entails 
representational intentionality, that explanation would not be available, for it 
would be plainly circular. 
Analogously to the way basic cognition arises in the maintenance of 
the sensorimotor loop between an organism and its immediate environment 
(HURLEY, 2001), high cognition arises in the maintenance of the “social-
loop”, so to speak, between an organism and its social environment. 
Therefore, the emergence of both basic and high cognition is the outcome of 
biological functions, which have been selected due to their success in our 
activities4. Importantly, as Hutto and Myin acknowledge, our distinct 
sociocultural activities and wide use of content entail an evolutionary discontinuity 
(2017, p.134-135), that is, it sets us apart from other cognitive beings. 
However, given that we share the same kind of basic, contentless cognition 
with other creatures, evolutionary continuity is present in basic minds5. 
2. The functional challenge 
Assuming that high cognition arises through our sociocultural 
practices, what function do high cognitive activities have? It is traditionally 
thought that humans have a distinctive range of cognitive abilities, such as 
reflection, viz., the capacity to perform cognitive acts aimed at one’s own 
cognitive states and processes. For instance, Sosa (2007) influentially argued 
that the ability to form accurate beliefs through stable epistemic dispositions 
about one’s own first-order beliefs marks the difference between human and 
animal knowledge. Although RECers reject a sharp evolutionary discontinuity, 
as we saw above, it remains an intuitive position that to think about our own 
states is something we can do par excellence, whereas not many (if any) other 
animals are able to reflect. Similar remarks also seem to hold for other 
attitudes such as conscious judging, performance assessment, decision making, 
                                               
4 Hutto’s and Myin’s REC tries to remain faithful to naturalism, albeit of a non-reductive variety, for they 
recognize that the emergence of higher cognition is at least partially sociocultural and not reducible to the 
physical and the chemical realms. 
5 A plausible suggestion for evolutionary continuity in basic minds is offered by tau theory, in which tau is 
the variable for the inverse of the relative rate of expansion on the retina of an incoming object (Lee, 
2009). Tau enables individuals to achieve information of incoming objects without representational 
content, and it explains not only human cognition, but also the behavior of diving gannets and possibly 
even plants in timescales usually imperceptible to animals (CALVO et al. 2014). 
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explicit rule following, thinking counterfactually and so on. What bounds these 
acts together is that they are usually understood as involving manipulation of 
representational content.  Nonetheless, as we have seen, teleosemiotics is 
deeply rooted in an evolutionary view, so claims about how one ought to 
perform higher cognitive tasks must be explained by the functional 
development underlying the abilities relevant for performing such tasks. 
However, psychology of reasoning has shown that we are widely 
unreliable reasoners, and the results expand to other higher cognitive abilities. 
There is abounding empirical data showing that real human beings diverge 
considerably from idealized rationality norms. For instance, conscious decision 
and explicit judging are more effortful and less reliable than heuristic 
procedures, i.e., processes that occur below the threshold of consciousness 
(the distinction between the Systems 1 and 2 is an attempt to explain these 
facts, see WASON & EVANS, 1975)6. We are systematically prone to fail at 
simple logical tasks, most notoriously the wason selection task (WASON, 
1968) and the conjunction fallacy (TVERSKY & KAHNEMAN, 1983). 
Reflection – the ability which is sometimes taken to be distinctively human – 
does not offer consistent results in identifying the sources of our first-order 
beliefs and explaining why we hold then (for an overview of the literature on 
the matter, see HALBERSTADT & WILSON, 2008). As Kornblith (2012) 
insists against philosophers that hold on to a crystalized ideal of reflection that 
simply is not manifested in normal individuals, we are more likely to 
confabulate and rationalize the beliefs we already hold than to critically 
evaluate them – not to mention the many different biases we systematically 
manifest. The overall conclusion is that there is no clear correlation between 
higher cognition and cognitive amelioration. Thus, given the functional tone 
underlying REC, the function of higher cognitive abilities presents a genuine 
puzzle, which is all the more surprising giving our widespread evolutionary 
success: Why would we have developed such unreliable adaptive tools vis-à-vis cognitive 
amelioration? 
3. Higher cognition as an adaptive tool of social systems 
So why have we developed an adaptive tool that is unreliable vis-à-vis 
cognitive amelioration? In order to offer a tentative explanation, the first thing 
to notice is that REC alone is insufficient for the task – for it is a view about 
the contentless nature of basic cognition, and by itself it offers no functional 
                                               
6 However, the dual-process model does not match the distinction between basic and higher cognition. 
According to REC, basic cognition is necessarily contentless, and higher cognition is contentful. Heuristic 
procedures that typically fall within system 1, insofar as they use symbols, are not basic cognitive skills. 
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explanation of higher cognition. It does, however, give us a hint of a possible 
explanation, through its take on the emergence of contentful cognition 
through social activities. The suggestion I want to explore is that higher 
cognition did not develop as adaptive tools for ameliorating our cognitive 
states – so we must look at the picture from a different angle: it serves social 
purposes rather than individual ones.  
As mentioned, REC per se offers no explanation, but Autopoietic 
Enactivism (AE) is a live contender. According to AE (MATURANA & 
VARELA 1980, Thompson 2007), the distinguishing feature of living systems 
is their autonomy or self-regulation, i.e., the ability to maintain their identity 
through self-organizing and self-producing dynamics. This is called autopoiesis 
in the biological domain, and the paradigmatic case is that of a living cell. An 
autonomous system itself determines, through its operations and structural 
organization, how to maintain its homeostatic equilibrium, without which the 
unbounded increase of energy leads to systemic death. By contrast, a 
heteronomous system is designed by an external agent and thus lacks the 
capacity of self-sustainment. In order to maintain its identity, an autonomous 
systems must remain organizationally and operationally closed, where 
“organizational closure refers to the self-referential (circular and recursive) 
network of relations that defines the system as a unity, and operational closure 
to the reentrant and recurrent dynamics of such a system” (THOMPSON, 
2007, p.45). Thus a system that loses its organizational and operational closure 
tends to dismantle itself and become something else altogether – consider a 
living organism turning into a molecular soup by failing to maintain a state of 
homeostatic equilibrium. 
AE and REC are not, however, straightforwardly compatible. As 
Hutto & Myin (2013) stress, proponents of AE also hold the strong life-mind 
continuity thesis, according to which a basic tenet of life and cognition is sense 
making. If sense making is understood semantically, AE implies a 
representational conception of basic minds, thus committing it to a 
conservative variety of enactivism. De Jesus (2016) accurately pinpoints the 
source of the problem: insofar as our phenomenology is the ground for the 
strong life-mind continuity thesis, and insofar as our phenomenology seems to 
be contentful, given that we are socially embedded creatures; it follows that all 
cognition (and all life) is contentful – hence widespread sense making. My 
argument here, however, does not depend on the strong life-mind continuity 
thesis, and even if it did, we could either review our phenomenological 
approach and clarify that our sociocultural practices are not representative of 
all cognition or construe “sense making” in a deflationary manner, such as the 
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contentless attitude of specifying environmental points of interest that serve as 
the basis for cognitive engagement. 
What is central for our purposes is that, according to AE, the causal 
relations between subsystem and system (or part and whole) are nonlinear or 
dynamical (THOMPSON, 2007, Appendix B). This means that the network of 
relations that constitute the emergence basis for the system as a whole is 
causally constrained by the organizational structure of the system itself: the 
system emerges from the relations within it, but also causally constrain its own 
internal dynamics, thus securing its operational and organizational closure. 
Moreover, so conceived, the emergence of systemic identity is explained 
through the internal dynamics of the system without positing a central 
executive agent to plan and organize its structure. 
With these points in mind, consider now a social system, e.g., a 
community of speakers of a certain language, a group of scientists working 
within the same research program, a political party, a family, etc. Although 
Varela and Maturana in their groundbreaking work on autopoiesis hesitate to 
construe social institutions as living systems (1980: 83), the inevitable 
association was quickly made in the preface written by Stafford Beer. Beer 
speculates whether it is instructive to adopt an epistemological stance 
according to which social systems are strictly autopoietic, for they show some 
striking resemblances to living organisms. For instance, social systems are not 
conceived beforehand, at least not normally, nor are they reducible to the sum 
of their members. Rather, they develop organically, and even if their members 
change, they tend to remain the same7. Moreover, social systems determine 
their own public rules according to their interests, internal dynamics and 
organizational structures, and it is the fact that the members of the system 
endorse these rules that promotes social identity. If Beer’s suggestion is 
correct, it means that the manner through which the rules are actually used 
within a social system is what grounds their correct use (consider, for instance, 
what makes a legislation legitimate – it certainly is not the simple fact that it is 
written as a law), whereas a social system that fails to maintain its 
organizational and operational closure tends to lose its identity (consider a 
research program that becomes incoherent at its core). Thus, the normative 
character of public rules within a social system is dynamical and emergent, for 
it is dependent on how these rules stablish the social relations within the 
                                               
7 Beer also maintains that the strong continuity between life, mind and social life explains the struggle for 
autopoiesis that social systems undergo, for each system can be understood as contained within larger 
one that tend to recognize its subsystems as allo-poietic (or heteronomous) rather than autopoietic 
(MATURANA & VARELA, 1980, p.71). Hereby I do not endorse that more controversial view, for my 
argument depends only on the claim that social systems are autonomous. 
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system and how these rules are endorsed by the ongoing relations realized 
among its members.  
High cognition, on the view I am proposing, is an adaptive tool of 
social systems, and as such is not primarily aimed at the cognitive amelioration of 
the members within the system. Notice first that, according to REC, high 
cognition emerges only insofar as individuals take part in sociocultural 
practices – therefore, the emergence base for content is publicly shared rules. 
Following Beer’s analogy, it stands to reason that the fact that individuals 
develop and exercise higher cognitive skills in specific manners is what ensures 
that the social system they are part of remains operationally and 
organizationally closed. So, in a social system, an individual is construed as a 
subsystem that is bound to the larger system through a network of relations 
with other individual subsystems. Importantly, the normative relations 
between system and subsystem are nonlinear in the sense we saw above: it is 
because a set of individuals acts in accordance to a set of rules that the rules 
become publicly endorsed, and the individuals act in accordance to these rules 
because they constrain their set of possible actions. Publicly shared rules 
(including those relative to contentful cognition) thus become one mean by 
which the social system defines its organizational and operational closure, 
hence, maintaining its own social identity (or social homeostasis).  
If that hypothesis is correct, it is predictable that different social 
systems may develop different sets of rules, so that the members of these 
systems perform higher cognitive activities according to their social settings. 
This is not equivalent to the universally accepted claim that some cultures have 
idiosyncratic world-views (including empirical beliefs and moral values, and 
even metaphysical backgrounds as well). What follows from the hypothesis 
above is a slightly more controversial claim, namely: members of different 
cultures may perform the same cognitive task differently (because these 
performances are in part what characterize their social identity). The 
controversy does not rest on the alleged fact that this is implausible, but on the 
fact that there is a widely shared assumption among traditional philosophers 
that higher cognitive skills are homogenous across the board, thus somehow 
detached from the social and situational backgrounds of specific societies. 
Although that expectation is independently plausible (pace traditional 
philosophers of course), only recently cross-cultural researches have suggested 
that there are significant differences in cognitive procedures across different 
cultures. In what follows, I will discuss some of that empirical evidence. 
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4. Empirical support 
One of the earliest notable findings on cross-cultural epistemic 
differences is that of the Azande by Evans-Pritchard (1937). According to 
Evans-Pritchard, members of the Azande, an isolated tribe that lives in Central 
Africa, believe that witchcraft is an inherited physical trait which is transmitted 
from father to son. However, they also believe that not all sons of healers are 
healers themselves, so they accept the conditional ‘if X is the son of a healer, 
then X is a healer’, accept the antecedent for a given individual, but may reject 
the conclusion, even systematically so. If this construal of their faulty 
reasoning is correct, the hypothesis I am advancing here is that a widespread 
cognitive mistake among the Azande is in part what characterizes their social 
identity, and that is why it is reinforced and accepted further. This case is not 
sufficient to stablish our point, however, because it is controversial whether 
the Azande were correctly translated. It may be the case that they believe that 
witchcraft is an inherited ability which is not necessarily exercised by every 
healer’s son (see COLIVA, 2010, p.196). Moreover, not enough data about the 
frequency of such error were raised, and it remains dubious whether this 
inferential mistake translates to other topics outside witchcraft and to other 
patterns of reasoning, such as the modus tollens. 
More compelling evidence has been presented by Nisbett and his 
colleagues (2008). They speculate that different world-views in ancient Chinese 
and Greek cultures ground present day social differences between East Asians 
and Westerners. Contemporary social differences are responsible not only for 
the different naïve metaphysical views and tacit epistemologies of each group, 
but also for the different nature of the cognitive processes of their members 
(2008, p.956). Specifically, the traditional Chinese world-view is based on social 
obligation and accordance to the whole, so that features of the world are 
primarily understood according to their relational properties instead of their 
intrinsic ones. This subsequently led to more attention to the field in 
understanding physical events and to the development of holistic thought, 
which is “associative, and its computations reflect similarity and contiguity” 
(2008, p.956). Overall, this explains the underdevelopment of Chinese formal 
systems of thought and the emphasis on thought procedures similar to 
Hegelian dialects. In contrast, the Greek ideals of social autonomy through 
debate, categorization and formalization led to the development of analytic 
and scientific thought in the western culture.  
Accordingly, there is compelling evidence that contemporary East 
Asians and Westerners significantly differ in sensitivity to hindsight bias, i.e., 
the tendency to assume that one knew all along that an otherwise surprising 
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outcome was likely. Because Easterners deploy holistic reasoning, they tend to 
ascribe relevance to a wide variety of facts in explaining a given event, whereas 
Westerners tend to focus their explanations on specific causes. That suggests 
that Easterners encounter more difficulty than Westerners in explaining why 
an outcome could not have been predicted. In a study conducted by Choi and 
Nisbett (2000), Koreans and Americans were asked to predict the outcome of 
a story about a Good Samaritan who was late for an appointment and found 
someone in pain on the way. Both groups ascribed similarly probabilities 
(around 80%) that the Good Samaritan would help the person in need. In one 
condition, they were told that he actually did not help, and then were asked 
what they would believe if they had not been told so. Americans mainly 
manifested surprise and held the same probability as before, whereas Koreans 
in general said it was just as likely that the Good Samaritan would not help, 
thus being more sensitive to hindsight bias. If this is correct, it shows that the 
ability to interpret former mental states – which classifies as higher cognition 
insofar as it deals in representations and even metarepresentations – is subject 
to change across different cultures. 
Similarly, Ji and her colleagues (2015) speculate that the difference 
between Chinese and Euro-Canadians lay theories of change – i.e., “beliefs on 
how events develop and change over time” (JI et al, 2015, p.2-3) – underwrite 
varying tendencies to believe in the gambler’s fallacy and in the hot hand 
fallacy. Euro-Canadians typically think of change linearly, emphasizing 
constancy and inertia, whereas Chinese typically think of change cyclically, so 
that an outcome is due to be replaced by a radically different one, (negative 
events lead to positive ones and vice-versa). Now, the gambler’s fallacy is the 
belief that a positive (or negative) outcome will follow a series of negative (or 
positive) ones, despite the fact that the trials are independent (as in dice 
throw). The hot hand fallacy is characterized by the belief that a successful 
outcome will follow a series of successful ones, becoming more likely over 
time, even if the trials are independent. If there is a substantial difference in lay 
theories of change, it is predictable that Euro-Canadians are more likely to 
commit the hot hand fallacy, and Chinese are more susceptible to the 
gambler’s fallacy. The findings by Ji and her colleagues in two studies, one 
involving coin toss and the other one involving basketball shots, confirm that 
prediction.  
Both cases above constitute suggestive evidence for different 
cognitive tendencies in individuals of different cultural backgrounds, but the 
stronger case for radically different cognitive procedures is made by Medin and 
his colleagues (MEDIN et al. 2006, BURNETT & MEDIN, 2008). In a task 
assigned two groups of fishermen living in North Wisconsin (European-
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Americans and Menominee Indians), they found notable differences in 
folkbiological taxonomy procedures. In that task, participants were presented 
with a set of cards, where each card had the name of a kind of fish on it. 
Participants were then asked to group the cards according to the fish that “go 
together by nature” (BURNETT & MEDIN, 2008, p.941). They were later 
asked to build larger and smaller categories, producing a “downward-
branching hierarchy of biological kinds” (ibid.). Although both groups live in 
the same area, interact with the same kind of fish, share the goal of catching 
adult fish only and use the same methods, they differed in their categorization 
reasoning. While the European-Americans used mainly morphological and 
taxonomic justifications to group the fish (e.g., belonging to the bass family), 
the Menominee preferred ecological ones (e.g. river or pond fish, bottom 
feeders, etc.). Next, participants of each group had to infer what kinds of fish 
were more liable to manifest a fictional disease. Although the task of 
performing inductive inference was similar for both groups – for both 
European-Americans and Menominee arrived at their beliefs based on their 
knowledge base – their taxonomic differences manifest different ways of 
representing the fish, thus showing that they differed on high cognitive 
procedures, as our hypothesis predicts. Burnett and Medin note that: 
Even among reasoners with the same knowledge, cultural factors may influence 
how this knowledge is organized, or the relative accessibility of different pieces 
of the knowledge base […] Differences in organization or accessibility may, in 
turn, be reflected in how reasoning strategies are derived from the knowledge 
base (2008, p.940). 
Importantly, the evidence above does not confirm the hypothesis that 
higher cognition is an adaptive tool of the social system, but it does lend strong support 
for its consequence, namely, that some social systems may have developed specific 
higher-cognitive skills. 
Conclusion 
Here I attempted to build upon RECers’ claim that high cognition 
emerges through sociocultural practices. This leads to the following challenge: 
what is the function of higher-cognitive attitudes, given the data according to 
which high cognition is not correlated with cognitive amelioration? The answer 
I offered for this question must be seen as an attempt to advance the REC 
program by sketching the general outlines for future research: the adaptive 
function of high cognition is not cognitive amelioration, but the maintenance 
of the social system within which contentful cognition arises.  
It is important now to clarify what I am not claiming. I am not 
claiming that achieving true beliefs and avoiding false ones should not be the 
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ultimate aim of our higher-cognitive performances. I am not advancing the 
relativistic views that everything goes, or that truth does not matter, or that 
manipulating representation is epistemically useless. It does seem clear that to 
retreat into a crystalized realm of a priori normativity is no longer tenable, given 
the significant findings in psychology of reasoning that demystify our cognitive 
abilities – but that is not to say that we are unable to recognize objectively bad 
cognitive performances, such as fallacious reasoning and selective bias. We are 
clearly able to do so, and we are able to correct these mistakes within our 
limitations. That possibility is still open in this framework because it does not 
rely on the view that the norms we actually employ in exercising our cognitive 
skills are strictly a priori. On the contrary, I assumed – alongside with level-
headed naturalists – that the naturalized normativity of publicly shared rules is 
contingent, so we could, in principle, correct systematic errors in our cognitive 
procedures. Therefore, the achievement of cognitive amelioration would 
promote changes, in the long run, within the social systems we are part of.  
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